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Abstract
Background: Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) piloted capitation payment for primary care
services in the Ashanti region from 2012 to 2017. Capitation was piloted as a means of cost containment but also
to induce managed competition among health providers to improve the responsiveness of healthcare delivery. This
study examined the effects of exposure to capitation on perceived health service quality and prevalence of out-of-
pocket payments in NHIS insured clients.
Methods: Respondents of the 2014 Ghana Demographic and Health Survey (G-DHS) who reported having a valid
NHIS card as their only form of health insurance coverage and made a health facility visit within the 6 months prior
to the survey were used to assess the exposure effects of capitation on four outcomes: overall patient satisfaction,
perceived friendliness of health staff, perceived adequacy of consultation time, and prevalence of out-of-pocket
payments. We applied propensity score matching to balance distributions of covariates and to compare outcomes
between exposed NHIS insured clients and their unexposed counterparts.
Results: NHIS insured clients exposed to capitation had 10 percentage points higher probability of encountering
out-of-pocket payments than their unexposed counterparts (p = 0.009; 95% CI: 2.5–17.8%). There was no evidence
of a difference between the two exposure groups for ratings of the three quality perceptions outcomes examined:
overall patient satisfaction, difference 0.63 units (p = 0.46); perceived friendliness of health staff, difference 1.1% (p =
0.50); and perceived adequacy of consultation times, difference 0.1% (p = 0.96).
Conclusion: In the Ghanaian context, our results suggest capitation was associated with a greater probability of
out-of-pocket payments and no difference in perceived service quality. Future research should examine clinical
quality of healthcare and how much out-of-pocket payment occurred under capitation.
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Background
In the face of escalating healthcare costs and limited
financial resources, the role of strategic purchasing to
improve health system performance and facilitate pro-
gress towards universal health coverage has become
increasingly critical. One of the key components of stra-
tegic purchasing is how health providers are paid for
contracted services [1]. This determines their exposure
to financial risk, the incentives they face, and conse-
quently, how they respond in terms of health service de-
livery [2]. Health purchasing agencies therefore often use
provider payment methods to influence provider behav-
iours in ways that promote efficiency, quality and re-
sponsiveness [3]. Ghana’s National Health Insurance
Scheme (NHIS), in its efforts to move away from passive
to more strategic purchasing, has been experimenting
with alternative payment methods to achieve cost-
efficient healthcare delivery to its beneficiaries without
compromising healthcare quality. The latest payment re-
form, following fee-for-service and diagnostic related
groupings (DRG), was the pilot of capitation in the
Ashanti region from 2012 to 2017.
The capitation pilot was for the payment of non-
specialist primary care outpatient services. All NHIS
contracted health facilities within the Ashanti region
participated in the payment reform while facilities in the
other nine regions remained under the existing Ghana
Diagnostic Related Grouping (G-DRG) payment method
for both outpatient and inpatient services. Per capita
rates were prospectively paid to health facilities to pro-
vide the capitated basket of services for their enrolled
clients for a period of 1 month. The capitated rate was
not risk adjusted but was adjusted to reflect health facil-
ities’ ownership. This was to account for supply-side
subsidies that public and quasi-government facilities
receive from government, mainly in the form of salaries
and infrastructure. Medicines and inpatient services
were excluded from the basket of capitated services and
continued to be paid for using itemized fee-for-service
and G-DRG [4]. Insured clients in the capitated region
freely and actively selected their health facility, known as
their Preferred Primary-care Provider (PPP) [5], and had
the option to change their PPP at six-month intervals [6].
Except for emergency cases, insured clients in the
capitated region were required to first visit their PPP for
medical services and if necessary be referred by their
PPP to other appropriate NHIS contracted health facil-
ities [6]. Consequently, insured clients who visited other
health facilities for non-emergency outpatient healthcare
without proper referral from their PPP were liable for
the cost of care [6]. As capitation payment is based on
the number of insured clients enrolled with a service
provider, health providers’ outpatient services revenue in
the capitated region was largely a product of the per
capita rate and the number of insured enrolled mem-
bers, plus the cost of medicines dispensed to insured
clients who sought care.
Theoretically, capitation serves as a cost control tool
by shifting some financial risk to health service providers
and thus encouraging them to deliver care in a more
cost-efficient manner [7]. However, the financial risk
imposed by capitation may present incentives to service
providers to undersupply healthcare [7] or provide sub-
standard care to reduce cost. Furthermore, in settings
where there may be inadequate controls and weak
monitoring mechanisms, capitation may lead to other
unintended consequences such as providers demanding
informal payments from insured clients in an attempt to
offset part of the risk.
While cost containment was the main driver for its
implementation [4], the NHIS implemented capitation
to also “introduce managed competition in providers
and choices for patients as a way of increasing the
responsiveness of [Ghana’s] health system” [8]. Evidence
from both industrialized and resource limited settings
suggests some cost containment effects of capitation
[9–12]. However, there is limited empirical evidence on
the effects of capitation on health service quality and out-
of-pocket payments among the insured. In Thailand,
Tangcharoensathien and colleagues [13] found that in-
sured clients whose outpatient services were paid for by
capitation were less likely to be satisfied in most of the
perceived quality outcomes the authors studied. Using re-
gression analysis, Andoh-Adjei et al. [14] found no signifi-
cant difference between NHIS insured clients in Ashanti
region (where capitation was piloted) and those in two
other regions in their likelihood of rating their perception
of quality of care as “good”. This study builds on the previ-
ous studies by using a sub-sample from a nationally repre-
sentative survey and applying a quasi-experimental
methodology (propensity score matching) to examine the
effects of capitation on perceived health service quality
and prevalence of out-of-pocket health payments using
Ghana’s capitation pilot as a case study.
Methods
Data sources
The study used data from the 2014 Ghana Demographic
and Health Survey (G-DHS), the sixth and most recent
survey. Details of the survey design and sampling strat-
egy are described elsewhere [15]. Briefly, the survey
stratified Ghana into urban and rural strata and sampled
427 enumeration areas (geographic demarcations of sets
of households) from these strata at the first stage while
12,831 households were systematically sampled from the
enumeration areas at the second stage [15]. At the
household level, all women aged 15–49 in all selected
households were eligible for interview while in half of
Siita et al. BMC Health Services Research          (2019) 19:732 Page 2 of 10
the selected households, all men aged 15–59 were eli-
gible. A total of 13,784 interviews in 9396 women and
4388 men were completed across the country [15]. The
2014 survey collected a broad range of data on health
and health insurance coverage including whether the
respondents had a valid NHIS card at the time of the
survey and whether respondents made a health facility
visit within the preceding 6 months. For those who
made a health facility visit, the survey collected informa-
tion on the kind of health services received, perceived
quality of services, and method of payment.
The current study included all men and women who
reported having a valid NHIS card as their only form of
health insurance coverage and made a health facility visit
within the 6 months prior to the survey for outpatient
services covered by NHIS.
Dependent and independent variables
Four main outcomes were evaluated: whether respon-
dents experienced an out-of-pocket payment during the
reported health facility visit and three perceived quality
outcomes - patients’ overall satisfaction level, perceived
adequacy of consultation time, and perceived friendli-
ness of service providers. Respondents’ overall level of
satisfaction was constructed as the sum of a 15-item
scale (Additional file 1: Table S1): measuring different
dimensions of health service quality on a five-point
Likert scale. Cronbach’s alpha for internal consistency of
the scale was 0.90, which is considered high [16]. The
robustness of the results was evaluated using principal
component analysis (PCA) to compute satisfaction
index.
For perception of adequacy of consultation time, the
survey asked respondents; “In your opinion, did the
health provider spend enough time with you?”, to which
they could answer “Yes” or “No”. Similarly, for perceived
friendliness of health staff, respondents were asked “Was
the health provider friendly to you?”. For the occurrence
of out-of-pocket payments, respondents were asked
“How did you pay for the service during this most recent
visit?” and they could answer “Cash”, “National Health
Insurance”, “Other insurance”, “Combination of any of
the above” or “Other”. Since the study’s sub-sample
comprised only respondents who reported having NHIS
as their only health insurance coverage, responses of
“Other” (10 observations) were recoded to missing and
responses of “Cash” or “Combination of any of the
above” were coded as out-of-pocket payments.
The main independent variable of interest was expos-
ure to the capitation pilot in the Ashanti region. The
exposed group was defined as insured respondents who
reported residing in the Ashanti region at the time of
the survey while those who reported residing outside the
Ashanti region, and therefore whose outpatient services
were paid for under G-DRG, were deemed unexposed.
Analytical approach
We employed propensity score matching [17, 18] to
balance relevant covariate distributions between the two
exposure groups and to estimate the exposure effects of
capitation on the outcomes for those who were exposed,
defined as E [Y (1) – Y (0)|T = 1]. Where Y (1) is the
observed outcome, Y (0) the counterfactual outcome
and T the treatment status. Two critical assumptions are
required for correct estimation of the exposure effect of
capitation using this approach. First, exposure to capita-
tion and the potential outcomes are assumed to be inde-
pendent conditional on the observed covariates and
second, every respondent is assumed to have a positive
probability of being in either exposure group - positivity
or overlap assumption [17]. If these two assumptions
hold, matching on the propensity score theoretically
removes bias from observed covariates [17, 19, 20] and
thus, allows for an unbiased estimate of treatment effect.
There is limited methodological guidance on how to
properly accommodate survey weights from complex
survey designs in the context of propensity score match-
ing [21]. Particularly, to the best of our knowledge, when
population inferences are of interest, it is not clear how
to properly account for both the fact that the propensity
scores are estimated and the complex survey weights in
estimating standard errors. Thus, we limited our study
to sample inferences and estimated sample average treat-
ment effect on the treated (SATET), which does not
need adjustments for complex survey weights [22].
We followed steps recommended by Caliendo and
Kopeinig [23] for the application of propensity score
matching to estimate treatment effect. First, logit models
were used to estimate the exposure probabilities and re-
spondents were matched based on similarities of their
exposure probabilities. Second, post-matching balance
diagnostics were performed to assess the balance of co-
variates distributions between the exposed and unex-
posed. Third, the resultant matched sample was used to
estimate the SATET. Finally, sensitivity analysis was con-
ducted to explore the robustness of the findings against
the assumption that no unmeasured confounders influ-
enced exposure allocation.
Estimation of propensity score and matching
Identification of covariates for the exposure probability
model was guided by review of the existing literature
[24] and only variables deemed to be potential con-
founders [25], but were not themselves likely to have
been affected by capitation exposure [23, 26] were con-
sidered. From the literature, type of facility visited, place
of residence, level of education, wealth, health status,
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and ethnicity were found to be correlates of health ser-
vice quality perceptions [13, 27–30]. Self-reported
clinician-diagnosed hypertension and household wealth
measurements were used as proxies for respondent’s
health status and wealth measurements respectively. The
G-DHS used household assets data and dwelling charac-
teristics to construct the wealth index and quintiles
using principal component analysis [15]. Other key
socio-demographic characteristics including age, gender,
and religion were also considered in building the pro-
pensity score model but only age was included in the
final model. It was initially planned to compute separate
propensity score models for quality perception and out-
of-pocket payment outcomes. However, the literature re-
view revealed that most variables associated with quality
perception were also associated with out-of-pocket pay-
ments. Thus, a single unweighted propensity score
model was estimated for all outcomes.
A nearest-neighbour matching, with replacement, pro-
cedure was then implemented using the estimated ex-
posure probabilities. We implemented a 1:1 matching
structure but allowed exposed respondents to be
matched with all closest unexposed respondents with
identical propensity scores (ties). To improve the quality
of matching, we imposed the condition that the max-
imum absolute difference between the exposure prob-
abilities of matched respondents was not more than
0.09. This matching algorithm produced the best balance
of covariates between the exposure groups with no loss
of observations to common support.
Post-matching balance diagnostics
Similarities of covariate distributions between exposure
groups in the matched sample were assessed using abso-
lute standardized mean differences (bias) and variance
ratios [31, 32]. After matching, the standardized differ-
ences in covariate means are expected to be zero (or
close to zero) and the variance ratios are expected to be
1 (or close to 1) if there is adequate balance of covari-
ates. While there appears to be no clear standard for
optimum balance of covariates [23], a standardized mean
difference greater than 0.1 is commonly cited as indica-
tive of substantial imbalance between groups [33, 34].
Rubin [34] further argues that variance ratios of covari-
ates outside the range of 0.8 and 1.25 reflect large differ-
ences between groups such that regression adjustments
for such covariates may not be reliable. Thus, a covariate
was considered balanced if its standardised mean differ-
ence was less than absolute 0.1 and its variance ratio
was between 0.8 and 1.25.
Estimation of capitation effects on the outcomes
The effects of capitation were estimated by comparing
the outcomes between the exposed and unexposed in
the matched sample. We used Stata’s teffects psmatch
command for the effect estimations. This estimator takes
into account that the propensity scores are estimated in
computing standard errors [35]. Additionally, we com-
puted robust standard errors to account for any cluster-
ing of respondents due to the survey design. All effect
estimates were evaluated at the 5% significance level.
Sensitivity analysis
We conducted sensitivity analysis on the effect estimates
using Rosenbaum-bounding approach [23, 36]. In sum-
mary, if there were no uneven influence of unmeasured
confounders, then a matched pair with the same covari-
ates would have equal odds of exposure allocation and
their odds ratio (Γ) would be equal to one [23]. By in-
creasing the value of Γ to reflect an inequality in the
odds of exposure assignment (Γ > 1), one can examine
the degree of influence that an unmeasured confounder
must have on the selection process to affect a study’s in-
ferences [23, 37]. For the outcomes with evidence of a
difference between the exposure groups, sensitivity ana-
lyses were conducted by examining different values of
Γ > 1, at increments of 0.1, to determine up to which
value of Γ a significance level of 0.05 was maintained. In-
ferences are considered sensitive to hidden bias if values
of Γ closer to 1 alter the results, and are considered rela-
tively robust if larger values of Γ are required to obtain
different results [38]. We used Stata’s mhbounds [36] for
the analysis.
Given that effect estimates can be affected by the kind
of matching algorithm implemented, we also used a dif-
ferent matching estimator (Stata’s teffects nnmatch) to
check the sensitivity of the effect estimates. Stata’s
teffects nnmatch estimator is nonparametric and uses
the Mahalanobis distance [19] to measure similarities
between subjects. The same variables used for estimating
the propensity score were used for the Mahalanobis
distance matching. We did not impose a maximum dis-
tance at which subjects were a potential match. Any
maximum distance below six (6) resulted in some loss of
exposed respondents to common support.
We used Stata statistical software (version 14.2) to
conduct all analyses and construct all figures.
Results
Background characteristics
Of the 13,784 respondents, 2256 met the selection cri-
teria out of which 16 respondents were excluded due to
missing data. Of the remaining 2240 respondents, 176
(8%) were exposed to capitation while 2064 (92%) were
unexposed. Table 1 presents the distributions and un-
adjusted comparisons of background characteristics be-
tween the exposure groups in the unmatched sample.
The sample was predominately female with 84% (1879)
Siita et al. BMC Health Services Research          (2019) 19:732 Page 4 of 10
Table 1 Comparison of background covariates between exposure groups in the unmatched sample
Mean
Variable Overall
(N = 2240)
Exposed
(N = 176)
Unexposed
(N = 2064)
P-valuea Standardized
Difference
Variance
Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Gender
Female 0.839 0.824 0.840 Ref. – –
Male 0.161 0.176 0.160 0.573 0.043 1.086
Age Group
15–19 0.113 0.125 0.112 0.613 0.039 1.102
20–24 0.163 0.131 0.166 0.227 −0.099 0.826
25–29 0.201 0.188 0.202 0.644 −0.037 0.950
30–34 0.165 0.188 0.163 0.396 0.065 1.124
35–39 0.143 0.119 0.145 0.344 −0.077 0.850
40–44 0.103 0.142 0.099 0.073 0.131 1.369
Over 44 yrs. 0.112 0.108 0.112 0.857 −0.014 0.970
Level of Education
None 0.227 0.085 0.239 < 0.001 − 0.426 0.431
Primary Education 0.157 0.091 0.163 0.012 −0.217 0.610
Secondary/Higher 0.616 0.824 0.598 < 0.001 0.513 0.607
Wealth Quintile
Poorest 0.245 0.051 0.262 < 0.001 −0.605 0.252
Poorer 0.170 0.097 0.176 0.007 −0.234 0.604
Middle 0.203 0.142 0.208 0.036 −0.175 0.743
Richer 0.200 0.318 0.190 < 0.001 0.296 1.415
Richest 0.181 0.392 0.163 < 0.001 0.527 1.754
Ethnicity
Akan 0.365 0.653 0.341 < 0.001 0.658 1.014
Ewe 0.136 0.017 0.146 < 0.001 −0.484 0.135
Mole-Dabgani 0.282 0.153 0.293 < 0.001 −0.339 0.631
Other 0.217 0.176 0.221 0.167 −0.112 0.847
Type of Residence
Rural 0.479 0.324 0.492 Ref. – –
Urban 0.521 0.676 0.508 < 0.001 0.347 0.881
Ever been told by a clinician as having hypertension
No 0.889 0.858 0.892 Ref. – –
Yes 0.111 0.142 0.108 0.168 0.103 1.271
Type of facility visited
Public/Government 0.831 0.688 0.843 Ref. – –
Private 0.169 0.313 0.157 < 0.001 0.373 1.632
Outcome Variables
Out-of-pocket payments 0.146 0.301 0.132 < 0.001 – –
Patient Satisfaction 59.439 60.756 59.327 0.031 – –
Perceived friendliness of staff 0.948 0.966 0.946 0.260 – –
Perceived adequacy of consultation time 0.926 0.915 0.927 0.541 – –
Note: The analyses are not weighted; aTwo-sample t-test comparisons of means between exposed and unexposed
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of respondents in the overall sample being women and
no difference between the exposed and unexposed
groups. Except for gender and most age groups, system-
atic differences between the exposure groups were
observed in all the covariates. Fifteen (15) of the covari-
ates recorded absolute standardized mean differences of
more than 0.1 (10%) while 12 of them recorded variance
ratios of less than 0.8 or more than 1.25.
Propensity score estimation and balance diagnostics
Results for the exposure probability model are reported
in (Additional file 1: Table S2). Wealth quintile and visit-
ing a private facility for healthcare were positively associ-
ated with exposure after adjusting for other covariates.
Conversely, holding other covariates constant, respon-
dents of other ethnic groups and those residing in urban
areas were less likely to be exposed compared to their
reference groups of being an Akan and residing in rural
areas.
All the exposed respondents found matches of unex-
posed counterparts. Matching eliminated or substantially
reduced, in absolute terms, the systematic differences in
covariates observed in the unmatched sample. After
matching, all the covariates had absolute standardized
mean differences less than 10% (Fig. 1) and their variance
ratios were all between 0.8 and 1.25 (Additional file 1:
Table S3). An assessment of the overlap assumption is
presented in Fig. 2. Though the unexposed density plot
showed a spike of probability mass near 1, the two density
plots overlap over a wide range on the x-axis suggesting
no evidence of a violation of this assumption.
Effects estimates of capitation on outcomes
Estimates of the effects of capitation on the four out-
comes are presented in Table 2. For prevalence of out-
of-pocket payments, the unadjusted estimates in the
unmatched sample suggested that exposed NHIS insured
patients were on average, about 17% more likely to ex-
perience out-of-pocket health payments compared with
their unexposed counterparts (p < 0.001; 95% Confidence
interval [CI]: 11.5–22.3%). After balancing the distribu-
tion of covariates between the two groups, the magni-
tude decreased to 10 percentage points but remained
significant (p = 0.009; 95% CI: 2.5–17.8%).
There was no evidence of a difference between the
two exposure groups in any of the perceived quality out-
comes after matching. Before matching, the exposed
group had on average, a statistically significant 1.43 units
higher overall satisfaction experience compared to the
unexposed (p = 0.031). This estimate however, dimin-
ished after matching to 0.63 units with a confidence
interval that includes zero (p = 0.464). The estimated dif-
ferences for both perceived friendliness of health staff
and perceived adequacy of consultation time between
the two exposure groups were neither statistically signifi-
cant in the unmatched sample nor in the matched
sample.
Fig. 1 Covariates balance before and after matching
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Sensitivity analysis
Table 3 presents the Rosenbaum-bounds sensitivity ana-
lysis for the prevalence of out-of-pocket estimate. Under
the assumption of no uneven influences of unmeasured
confounders, the odds ratio (Γ) is 1 and the effect esti-
mate is significant. However, if there were unmeasured
confounders such that insured clients exposed to capita-
tion were more likely to experience out-of-pocket pay-
ment even without capitation and given that they have
the same observed covariates as the comparison group,
then the current estimate would have over-estimated the
exposure effects of capitation. Under the assumption of
over estimation, an unobserved variable would have to
influence the odds ratio of exposure allocation to differ
between the two exposure groups by a factor of more
than 1.4 to make the estimate non-significant at the 5%
level and by a factor of more than 1.5 to render it non-
significant at the 10% level (Table 3). However, assuming
an under estimation, the estimate remained significant
at all considered levels of Γ suggesting that it was un-
likely to be an underestimate.
Results of the Mahalanobis distance matching metric
are reported in (Additional file 1: Table S4). The effect
estimates are very similar to those of the propensity
score matching (Table 2). Similarly, there was no quali-
tative difference in the results when estimating the satis-
faction index using PCA (Additional file 1: Table S5).
Discussion
This study investigated the effects of capitation on
prevalence of out-of-pocket health payments and per-
ceived service quality in insured clients using Ghana’s
capitation pilot as a case study. Propensity score match-
ing was used to balance distributions of observed covari-
ates between NHIS insured clients who were exposed to
capitation and their unexposed counterparts.
We found that exposed NHIS insured clients had
higher probability of encountering out-of-pocket health
payments than their unexposed counterparts. With re-
spect to the sensitivity analysis for this estimate, DiPrete
and Gangl [36] and Becker and Caliendo [37] advised
that results from Rosenbaum bounds sensitivity analysis
are “worst case scenarios” and that the point at which
the results become sensitive to possible bias should not
be interpreted as the presence of bias or the absence of a
true exposure effect on the outcome. Both authors
Fig. 2 Exposure probability densities of exposure groups
Table 2 Exposure effects of capitation on outcomes
Outcome Before Matching After Matching
Crudea Mean Diff. t-stat P-value SATETb S.E.c z-stat P-value 95% Confidence Interval
Prevalence of out-of-pocket 0.169 6.15 < 0.001 0.101 0.039 2.61 0.009 0.025 0.178
Perceived Quality Outcomes
Patients’ Satisfaction 1.429 2.16 0.031 0.625 0.854 0.73 0.464 −1.048 2.298
Perceived friendliness of health staff 0.020 1.13 0.260 0.011 0.017 0.68 0.499 −0.021 0.044
Perceived adequacy of consultation time −0.013 − 0.61 0.541 0.001 0.025 0.05 0.956 −0.048 0.051
aUnadjusted mean differences; bSample average treatment effect on the treated; cRobust standard errors
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emphasised that the results from such analysis only
indicate the point at which an effect estimate would be-
come non-significant due to the influence of possible
unmeasured confounders.
It is unclear whether the reported out-of-pocket pay-
ments were for services or medicines not included in the
NHIS benefits package. However, given that the NHIS
covers up to 95% of common clinical conditions in
Ghana [39] and does not have balance billing or co-
payment arrangements in its design, it is very unlikely
that these reported payments were for services/medi-
cines not covered by the NHIS. It is more likely that the
out-of-pocket payments took the form of informal pay-
ments to providers. A major criticism levied against the
capitation pilot from health providers was that the capi-
tated rate was too low [4, 40]. It is therefore plausible
that health facilities might have developed ways to sup-
plement or compensate for any loss or perceived loss in
revenue. Particularly, as the capitated rate was not risk
adjusted, service providers with a disproportionate num-
ber of high-risk insured clients such as the elderly and
those with chronic diseases would have been faced with
even higher financial risk and therefore more likely to
shift some of the risk to insured clients in the form of
informal co-payments. Alternatively, the exposed insured
clients might not have complied with the requirement
under capitation to first visit their PPP when ill and
might have bypassed their PPP to access healthcare from
other facilities and therefore had to use alternative pay-
ments including out-of-pocket. Agyei-Baffour et al. [41]
explored the perceptions and expectations of NHIS in-
sured clients in the capitated region and reported that
most insured clients cited the restriction to a single facil-
ity under capitation as a disadvantage of the payment
reform.
In contrast to the out-of-pocket payments, we did not
find any evidence of significant differences between the
two exposure groups in any of the three perceived qual-
ity outcomes. Our findings are consistent with the find-
ings by Andoh-Adjei et al. [14] and other studies that
have investigated perceived health service quality be-
tween different groups in Ghana [27, 28, 42], but differ
from those of Tangcharoensathien and colleagues [13]
who found that insured clients under capitation were
less likely to be satisfied with healthcare delivery com-
pared to those under different payment methods. Given
the high perceived quality ratings by both exposure
groups (Table 1), our findings may suggest a possible
spill over effect of the capitation pilot in the Ashanti re-
gion. The National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA,
the governing body of the NHIS) made clear during the
pilot its intention of a nationwide roll-out. Health ser-
vice providers in the other regions might have enhanced
their interpersonal relationships with NHIS insured cli-
ents with the expectation that they would register with
their facilities when capitation was eventually imple-
mented nationwide.
It is unclear if capitation was able to induce competi-
tion in health facilities in the pilot region as was antici-
pated by the NHIA. The ability for capitation to induce
competition may depend on availability of adequate
choice of health providers for insured clients. Hence, in
settings where there are limited or no alternative health
facilities to choose from or switch to, as is likely to be
the case in most rural areas in Ghana, the conditions ne-
cessary for competition among facilities may be lacking
or limited and therefore unable to induce the desired
competition among health providers. In such settings,
policy actors may need to consider explicitly integrating
some quality benchmarks, including those of quality
Table 3 Rosenbaum-bounds sensitivity analysis for estimate of prevalence of out-of-pocket payments
Gamma
(Γ)
Mantel-Haenszel Test Statistic Significance level
Assumption:
Over-estimation
Assumption:
Under-estimation
Assumption:
Over-estimation
Assumption:
Under-estimation
1.0 3.467 3.467 < 0.001 < 0.001
1.1 2.974 3.970 0.001 < 0.001
1.2 2.525 4.432 0.006 < 0.001
1.3 2.115 4.862 0.017 < 0.001
1.4 1.737 5.265 0.041 < 0.001
1.5 1.387 5.645 0.083 < 0.001
1.6 1.059 6.005 0.145 < 0.001
1.7 0.753 6.348 0.226 < 0.001
1.8 0.464 6.674 0.321 < 0.001
1.9 0.191 6.987 0.424 < 0.001
2.0 −0.068 7.288 0.527 < 0.001
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perceptions, into capitation designs to encourage health
providers to deliver quality care.
The current study has some limitations. First, we as-
sumed that respondents’ insurance status at the time of
the survey interview was the same when they accessed
the reported healthcare and that they accessed the care
in their reported residing regions. These assumptions
may not be true for all respondents. However, any such
occurrences are likely to be randomly distributed be-
tween the two exposure groups and therefore unlikely to
differentially bias the findings. Second, as implied in our
definition of exposure to capitation, regional-level con-
founding could not be adjusted for. If there were any
region-specific factors that affected the outcomes beyond
the payment method difference, then those factors could
introduce some bias in our estimates. Also, we could not
adjust for some facility-level potential confounders such
as level or size of health facility due to data limitations.
For the out-of-pocket outcome however, the sensitivity
analysis showed the extent of influence any unobserved
or omitted variables must have on the allocation process
to make the inference non-significant. Third, the study
may suffer from “courtesy bias” [5]; a phenomenon
where Ghanaian patients typically express satisfaction
with healthcare services out of the respect they tend to
have for healthcare providers and not necessarily a re-
flection of their true experience with the healthcare de-
livery. Finally, as we did not incorporate the survey
sampling weights in our analyses, our findings may not
be generalizable to the target population of the G-DHS.
The results should therefore be interpreted within the
context of these limitations.
Conclusion
In the Ghanaian context, our findings suggest capitation
was associated with a greater probability of out-of-pocket
payments, and no effect on perceived service quality. Fu-
ture research should examine clinical quality of healthcare
and intensity of out-of-pocket payments under capitation.
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